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Abstract 
This paper reports simulations of supply chain disruptions regarding the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and the predicted Nankai Trough Earthquake. The simulations are based on the actual 
nationwide supply chains of Japan and on an agent-based model. As a result, we obtain the following 
findings. (1) Based on simulations of the Great East Japan Earthquake, we calibrate the parameters 
in the model. The result shows that the simulation reproduces the aftermath of the disaster well, 
which means the simulation captures the propagations of the damages and the recoveries from them 
on supply chains. (2) Indirect damages of both earthquakes geographically permeate the entire 
country in a quite short term. Additionally, the damages to firms show synchronized fluctuations due 
to the network structure. (3) Simulations of the Nankai Trough Earthquake show that direct damages 
are 12 times greater than those from the Great East Japan Earthquake, but indirect damages are 
approximately 4.5 times greater in a year. (4) By estimating indirect damage triggered by a single 
firm loss, approximately 10% of firms cause more than 10% damage of the entire supply chains. 
 
Keywords: supply chain, propagation, disaster, agent, simulation, high performance computing 
JEL classification: L14 
 
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional 
papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the 
author(s) and do not represent those of the organization to which the author(s) belong(s) or the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
                                                   
* This research was conducted as part of a project entitled ‘Large-scale Simulation and Analysis of Economic Network for Macro 
Prudential Policy,’ undertaken at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI). This study utilizes firm-level 
data collected by Tokyo Shoko Research and licensed to RIETI. The authors are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions 
by participants at the Discussion Paper seminar at RIETI. The authors would also like to thank a JSPS Kakenhi Grant (No. 
15K01217). The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of RIETI, University of Hyogo, Waseda University, or any institution with which the authors are 
affiliated. This research was also supported by MEXT as Exploratory Challenges on Post-K computer (Studies of Multi-level 
Spatiotemporal Simulation of Socioeconomic Phenomena). 
  2 
1. Introduction 
 
When natural disasters affect some regions, the economic damage permeates the supply chain and 
causes disruptions [Sheffi and Rice, 2005]. Therefore, indirect damages are often greater than direct 
damages [Tierney, 1997, Pelling et al., 2002]. For example, when the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(hereafter GEJE) in 2011 affected firms on the northeast coast, many firms in Japan were unaffected 
at the time. However, not only the unaffected firms but also firms in foreign countries stopped their 
operations due to shortages of supplies. Another example is the floods in Thailand in 2011. Since 
Thailand is a large producer of hard-disk drives, many firms assembling personal computers had to 
stop globally. Because the indirect damages are serious, models to estimate these damages have 
attracted interest in the economic literature [Rose, 2004]. 
 
  One major approach is based on input-output (IO) tables [Leontief, 1936], which are matrices of 
the input-output relations among different sectors in the economy. More precisely, IO tables show 
how much input from each sector is required to produce one dollar of production in a sector. IO 
tables have been used to estimate the effects of a shock in a sector on production in other sectors 
through inter-sectoral production relations [Haimes and Jiang, 2001, Santos and Haimes, 2004]. In 
particular, [Okuyama et al., 2004] examined using IO tables the indirect effects of natural disasters 
due to supply chain disruptions. Although earlier works relied on fixed IO tables before and after 
disasters, [Rose and Liao, 2005] incorporated flexible coefficients into IO tables by employing 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. In their model, the number of inputs required for 
production in a particular sector is endogenously determined in the model and thus can be changed 
after a shock.  
 
  However, this approach using IO tables is clearly insufficient to examine the propagation of 
negative shocks through supply chains because IO tables capture production relations at the sector 
level and not at the firm level [Haimes and Jiang, 2001]. In other words, although how indirect 
damages propagate through supply chains depends heavily on how directly damaged firms are 
connected to other firms [Hallegatte, 2008], such networks at the firm level are not captured by IO 
tables.  
 
  To overcome this shortcoming of models based on IO tables at the sector level, [Hallegatte, 2008] 
proposed an agent-based model in which firms, rather than sectors, interact with each other through 
supply chains. Using this model, this author simulated how damages due to a negative shock 
propagate through supply chains. However, because the author lacked actual data on supply chain 
relations among firms, hypothetical random networks were used, although they incorporate actual 
IO relations at the sectoral level into the model. In contrast, [Bak et al., 1993, Delli et al., 2005] 
utilized firm-level models but did not incorporate actual data. 
 
  The use of hypothetical networks, rather than actual ones, in simulation analysis is clearly a 
drawback because the network science literature has shown that a small difference in the network 
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structure can lead to a substantial difference in the behaviors of agents in the network [Newman, 
2010, Barabási, 2016]. Recently, the economics literature has also identified the role of the structure 
of firm networks in the propagation of negative shocks [Gabaix, 2011, Acemoglu et al., 2012]. 
Therefore, one might not obtain any reasonable conclusions about how damages in terms of 
production by natural disasters propagate through supply chains without using actual data from 
networks of firms in the economy. Such investigations have not been performed, although 
propagation of negative shocks through financial networks of firms has been modeled [Gieseckey 
and Weber, 2006, Battiston et al., 2007] and empirically examined using actual data [Fujiwara and 
Aoyama, 2010, De Masi et al., 2011]. 
 
  Based on the above discussion, we conducted a series of simulations based on the nationwide 
supply chain in Japan, as well as a modified model of [Hallegatte, 2008] to tackle this issue. Using 
artificial disasters, not actual disasters, we clarified the features of the propagation regarding the 
data and the model. First, if we assume that the supply chain is the random network, which is 
widely used as a hypothetical supply chain, the outcome is totally different from the actual network, 
and it underestimates the indirect damage. Second, the heterogeneity of damages leads to different 
results. Intensive damages, i.e., larger damages to fewer firms, result in faster and greater 
propagation than extensive damages. Finally, the actual supply chain derives robustness from the 
substitution of intermediate supplies. 
 
  In contrast, there are several issues that have not yet been clarified in simulations. First, the results 
have been based on artificial disasters and have not included analyses of actual disasters. Second, 
recovery, which the actual economy undergoes, has not been considered. Finally, the models have 
had parameters, but the values have been arbitrarily decided. Therefore, simulations cannot surely 
estimate indirect damages caused by disasters. 
 
  To complement the missing parts of the analyses, we discuss actual and predicted disasters and 
estimate parameters in the model. As a result, we obtain the following findings. (1) Based on 
simulations of the GEJE, we calibrate parameters in the model. The result shows that the simulation 
reproduces the affected supply chains in the Japanese economy in the sense of propagations of 
damages and recoveries from them. (2) Indirect damages of both earthquakes geographically 
permeate the entire country. Additionally, the damages to firms show synchronized fluctuations due 
to the network structure. (3) Simulations of the Nankai Trough earthquake (hereafter NTE), which is 
predicted meticulously, result in damages 12 times larger than those of the GEJE, although indirect 
damages are 4.5 times larger. (4) By estimating indirect damage triggered by a single firm loss, 
approximately 10% of firms cause more than 10 % damage of the entire supply chain. 
 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 
describes the model used in our simulation analysis. Section 4 shows the simulation results and 
provides a discussion. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data 
 
The core data of this paper consist of a firm-level supply chain. Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) 
collected the data every year based on questionnaires for firms. This investigation covers almost all 
of the active firms in Japan. Specifically, we use the TSR Company Information Database and the 
TSR Company Linkage Database collected in 2011 because we simulate the indirect damage of the 
GEJE. The databases are licensed to the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 
The data include detailed firm information. We use identifiers, addresses of headquarters, industrial 
classifications and sales among this information so that we can incorporate the data into simulations. 
We should note that, although the maximum number of suppliers and clients reported by each firm 
is 24, we can capture more than 24 suppliers and clients because a large firm is designated by many 
other firms as a supplier and client. Therefore, the number of suppliers and clients is not limited to 
24. Actually, many firms have more than 1,000 relationships [Fujiwara and Aoyama, 2010]. The 
number of firms in the supply chain is 1,109,549, and the number of supplier-client relationships is 
5,106,081. However, the numbers decrease based on the procedure described later. 
 
  We obtain the exact locations of firms from the addresses of their headquarters using the 
geocoding service provided by the Center for Spatial Information Science, the University of Tokyo. 
The locations are used especially to identify the directly damaged firms, which are necessary for the 
later sections. We should note that firms might have branches or factories at different addresses from 
the headquarters and that transactions occur between addresses. However, it is natural to 
acknowledge that the headquarters have significant functions of the firms. In addition, it seems that 
relationships between branches or factories change more often than the relationships between firms; 
hence, it is unrealistic to obtain and utilize the data. Therefore, it seems acceptable to use the 
addresses of headquarters when we identify the firms that are directly damaged. 
 
  Although the TSR data include information about who the suppliers and clients are, the 
relationship information does not include the values of transactions in each supplier-client tie. Since 
we need the values of ties, we estimate the values with the following two-step calculations. First, 
each supplier's sales are divided into clients as values (as purchases) proportional to the sales of the 
clients. This step provides each link with a tentative value. However, there are two shortcomings to 
the tentative values at this step. One comes from a lack of information about sales regarding final 
consumers, which is obviously not negligible for simulating the economy and is necessary for our 
simulations. The other shortcoming comes from the deviation compared to gross domestic product. 
Since our simulations can output production and the value added (gross domestic product), we can 
compare simulations with actual data, which is important for simulating the earthquakes and their 
aftermaths. Therefore, as a second step, we incorporate an IO table for Japan in 2011 obtained from 
[Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2011]. Note that we use the IO table to adjust our values 
and not to conduct conventional analyses based on IO tables. As a concrete procedure, we aggregate 
transaction values at the sector level based on the industrial classifications of firms, i.e., from one 
sector to another. More specifically, the value of products from sector A sold to sector B, obtained 
  5 
from tentative values in the first step, is linearly multiplied so that the value fits a value in the IO 
table. Similarly, the value of the final consumption of products from sector A in the IO tables is 
proportionally divided among all of the suppliers in sector A in the TSR data using their sales. 
Through these two steps, the aggregate of the tie-level transaction values equals those from the IO 
tables. Some firms, however, do not have sales information, and the above procedures are not 
applicable. As a result, the final number of the firms is 887,715, and the final number of links is 
3,223,137. 
 
  As a minor adjustment, industries are categorized by the Japan Standard Industrial Classification 
(JSIC) [Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2013] in the TSR data. The 1,460 
classifications at the four-digit level of JSIC are converted into the 190 basic sector classifications of 
the IO tables. 
 
  The GEJE was the largest earthquake in Japanese history and the fourth largest earthquake in 
world history [Cabinet Office in Japan, 2012]. The magnitude was 9.0. The victims numbered more 
than 18,000 people (including missing persons). The estimation of the direct damage was 16.9 trillion 
yen (including buildings, lifelines, etc.). 
 
  Since the GEJE was an actual disaster, we can use the data related to direct damages and the 
aftermath to calibrate the model. As far as we know, there are no published data that exhaustively 
show how each firm sustained damage. Therefore, we combine several sources and create direct 
damage data for simulations. The important feature of the earthquake is a combination of disasters, 
i.e., the earthquake and the tsunami caused by the earthquake. Therefore, we separate the damaged 
areas into two types. One is affected by the tsunami (coast side), and the other is affected by the 
earthquake (inland). Although the coast side unmistakably experienced the earthquake, the tsunami 
damage was greater, and it is valid that we assign the coast side to the tsunami area. We refer to 
[Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2014] for the two areas. The left panel in Figure 1 
shows the areas. The areas are at the municipal level.  
 
  Although the damage areas are separated into the inland and the coast side, the firms in these 
areas obviously did not experience uniform damage. In addition, the heterogeneity of the damage 
caused totally different outcomes [Inoue and Todo, 2017]. Therefore, each firm's damage is 
stochastically decided by a distribution based on the statistics [The Small and Medium Enterprise 
Agency, 2011]. Table 1 shows the distribution of the damages. 
 
  The heterogeneous damages of directly damaged firms are stochastically chosen based on the 
above areas and distributions. The left panel in Figure 2 is a sample of directly damaged firms and 
their volumes of damages for the GEJE. The damage is shown as the production capacity, which is 
explained in the next section. We can see that the firms on the coast side experience more serious 
damages than those inland. 
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  The Nankai megathrust earthquake is a great earthquake that will occur along the fault line under 
the Nankai Trough. The fault line lies to the south of Honshu island (the main island of Japan). 
These earthquakes occur periodically at an interval of approximately 90 to 200 years. The probability 
of the next earthquake occurring is more than 70% over 30 years, and a typical estimation predicts 
that there will be victims of approximately 23 thousand people and economic losses of 95 billion yen 
[Cabinet Office in Japan, 2014]. The next earthquake has been multilaterally studied, including many 
different components and scenarios. 
 
  As is the case of the GEJE, we create maps of damaged areas. We incorporate the first report of the 
disaster management working group for the Nankai Trough Great earthquake [Cabinet Office in 
Japan, 2013]. It predicts the exact locations affected by an earthquake and tsunami. Among many 
scenarios, we choose a typical scenario. The predicted damage due to the earthquake and tsunami is 
provided by plots on the map. If a municipality has a plot greater than or equal to "seismic intensity 
6 strong" on the Japanese scale, the municipality is assigned damage due to the earthquake. In 
addition, if a municipality has a plot of a tsunami higher than 5 m, the municipality is assigned 
damage due to the tsunami, and the assignment of the tsunami overrides that of the earthquake. The 
obtained map is shown in the right panel of Figure 1. The stochastically chosen firms are shown in 
the right panel of Figure 2. We can simulate the direct and indirect damages due to the next 
earthquake based on the detailed prediction given by the model and simulation, with the 
parameters calibrated by the GEJE.  
 
3. Model 
 
The model proposed by [Hallegatte, 2008] underlies our model, but we make several improvements. 
The model is an agent-based model. Agents, such as firms and final consumers, follow rules. There 
are no optimizations such as those imposed by the general equilibrium model. By the same token, 
firms do not have access to global information or the information of firms that are not adjacent to 
them. They only know the information of adjacent firms. 
 
  Each firm uses a variety of intermediates as inputs and delivers a specific product defined by the 
sector to which the firm belongs. The targets of delivery are other firms and final consumers. As a 
feature of the model, firms have inventories of intermediates to address possible supply shortages. 
However, there is no inventory for the products that they deliver. An overview of the model is 
provided in Figure 3, showing flows of products to and from firm i in sector r in particular.  
 
  We later consider a natural disaster that affects firms in the supply chain so that some products 
cannot meet demands due to direct or indirect damages. However, before considering disasters, we 
first describe the pre-disaster situation. The daily trade volume from supplier j to client i before the 
disaster is denoted by Ai,j, whereas the daily trade volume from firm i to final consumers is denoted 
as Ci. Then, the initial production of firm i in a day before the disaster is given by  
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𝑃𝑃ini𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
+ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖. (1)  
 
  Henceforth, we consider the situation after a disaster. At time t=0, a disaster occurs. We assume 
that firm i has an inventory Si,j  of the intermediate good produced by firm j and restores the 
inventory to a level equal to a given number of days ni of utilization of product j. On day t, the 
orders from firm i to its supplier j, denoted as Oi,j(t), is then given by  
where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑡𝑡 − 1) is a realized demand for firm i on day t-1, the previous day, and 𝜏𝜏 is the number 
of days to adjust its inventory size. For example, when 𝜏𝜏  is six, as we assume later in our 
simulations, firms plan to fill the gap between the projected inventory (i.e., n days of demand) and 
the actual inventory gradually. Concretely, firms make order for adjusting inventories by one sixth 
of the gap. The first term of the right-hand side of equation (2) is the amount of product j that is 
needed to satisfy the demand on the previous day. The second term indicates the amount of product 
j that is needed to restore the inventory to the projected level.  
 
  One might think that, if the economy is experiencing a disaster, the projected inventory is 
disregarded by the firm. However, since firms do not know whether they are involved in the 
disaster indirectly or not, including the degree of the effect, it is natural that they attempt to 
maintain the same level as their pre-disaster inventory size. 
 
   Accordingly, the total demand for product i on day t, Di(t), is given by the sum of the final 
demand from consumers and the total orders from its clients: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡).
𝑗𝑗
 
(3)  
 
  Here, we consider a disaster affects the economy and damages firm i directly. We assume that a 
certain proportion, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(t), of production capital of firm i is destroyed by the disaster. Then, the 
production capacity of firm i, 𝑃𝑃cap𝑖𝑖(t), or its maximum production assuming no supply shortage is 
given by 
 𝑃𝑃cap𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃ini𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)). (4)  
 
  The production of firms might also be limited by shortages of supplies. Because we assume that 
firms in the same sector produce the same product, shortages of supplies from firm j in sector s can 
be compensated for by supplies from firm k in the same sector (Figure 3). In other words, we do not 
assume changes in supply chain ties after the disaster. Thus, the total inventory of product s in firm i 
on day t is  
 
𝑆𝑆tot𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡).
𝑗𝑗∈𝑠𝑠
 
(5)  
Initial consumption of product s at firm i is also defined for convenience. 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑡𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑃ini𝑖𝑖 + 1𝜏𝜏 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑡𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑃ini𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)�, (2)  
  8 
 
𝐴𝐴tot𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 = � 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗.
𝑗𝑗∈𝑠𝑠
 
(6)  
Using the above two variables, 𝑃𝑃pro𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), maximum production for firm i limited by the inventory of 
product s on day t is obtained as follows. 
 
𝑃𝑃pro𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆tot𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴tot𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃ini𝑖𝑖 . (7)  
 
  Then, we can determine the maximum production of firm i on day t, considering its production 
capacity, 𝑃𝑃cap𝑖𝑖, and its production constraints due to shortages of suppliers, 𝑃𝑃pro𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡): 
 
𝑃𝑃max𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = Min �𝑃𝑃cap𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), Min𝑠𝑠 �𝑃𝑃pro𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)��. (8)  
Actual production of firm i on day t is, therefore, given by 
 𝑃𝑃act𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = Min�𝑃𝑃max𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)�. (9)  
 
  When the demand for a firm is greater than its production capacity, the firm cannot completely 
satisfy its demand, as denoted by equation (9). In this case, firms should ration their production to 
their clients. [Hallegatte, 2008] proposed a rationing policy in which each client firm and the final 
consumers receive the number of products in the same proportions (Pacti/P ini) as its pre-disaster trade 
volume. However, this allocation might not be the case in practice. For example, if we suppose that 
client h of firm i in sector r increases its demand for product r after the disaster because other 
suppliers of product r for client h are destroyed, then according to this rationing policy, firm i will 
decrease the supply of product r to other firms, although these firms are not affected directly by the 
disaster or affected indirectly by their suppliers. Thus, this rationing policy is most likely to augment 
the propagation of negative shocks, leading to overvaluation of the effects of disasters. For example, 
10% damages (δ = 0.1) for firms can result in complete incapability of the supply chain network, 
which might not occur in the actual economy. 
 
  Therefore, for our improvement, we employ another rationing policy, in which firms are 
prioritized according to the level of order after the disaster relative to their initial order. Note that 
we do not have to consider a rationing policy if the production capacity is greater than the demand. 
 
  We explain this improved policy more concretely. We suppose that firm i producing r has two 
client firms, g and h, and a final consumer (see Figure 3). In addition, because of disasters, we 
suppose that firm i has two clients g and h, and importantly, product r from firm i cannot fill their 
demand. Let's consider that the ratios of post-disaster orders to pre-disaster orders (hereafter, the 
post-to-pre-order ratio) are 0.6 and 0.7 for firms g and h, respectively. In contrast, the corresponding 
ratio for final consumers remains one. As a first step, firm i calculates the minimum post-to-pre 
order ratio among all of its clients and the final consumer. The minimum ratio is 0.6 for firm g in this 
case. This minimum ratio is applied to all of the clients and the final consumer. In this case, 0.6 is 
applier for firm g and h, and the final consumer. Now, if the total demand obtained by applying the 
minimum ratio is greater than firm i's remaining production capacity, firm i distributes its product 
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to all of the clients and the final consumer equally. In this case, the rationing process is completed. 
On the other hand, if the total demand is smaller than firm i's remaining production capacity, firm i 
first fulfill the demand with the minimum ratio for all the clients and the final consumer. In the 
current case, the minimum ratio, 0.6 is fulfilled for client g and h, and the final consumer. Now, 
although the demand from the client with the minimum post-to-pre order ratio is fully met, the 
demand from other clients remains. In the current case, 0 for client g, 0.1 for client h, and 0.4 for the 
final cosumer remain. Thus, we follow the same procedure from the beginning until the remaining 
production capacity is completely used to the clients and final consumers.  
 
  Following the rationing policy, the realized total demand for firm i, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖∗(𝑡𝑡), is then given by 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
∗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖∗ + � 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∗ (𝑡𝑡)𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 ,
𝑗𝑗
 
(10)  
where the realized order from firm i to supplier j is denoted as 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∗ (𝑡𝑡), and the realized demand 
from final consumers is 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖∗. Accordingly, the inventory of firm j's product in firm i is modified to 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑡𝑡) − 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃act𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑃ini𝑗𝑗 . (11)  
 
  Thus far, the model does not have a recovery mechanism to disasters. However, the actual 
economy reacts to malfunction. For example, a firm can switch or add a supplier or client because it 
cannot buy or sell products. Another example is over-production. If a firm receives more demand 
than the pre-disaster level, it can react to the demand by producing more, which might be 
accomplished by asking workers on overtime or by hiring temporary workers. Other than the above 
examples, there might be other reactions. However, it is not realistic to consider all of them. For 
simplification, we introduce a simple reaction in this study. A firm that is directly damaged stops for 
σ days and then recovers γ in ratio, that is, 
 δ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = (1 − 𝜁𝜁𝜁𝜁)𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 − 1), (1)  
where ζ is a damping factor. ζ is a ratio of healthy neighbors to neighbors. Therefore, for example, 
if no neighbors of firm i do not sustain direct damages (including already recovered firms), ζ = 1. 
On the contrary, if all neighbors still sustain direct damages, ζ = 0.  This damping factor is 
introduced on the basis of the empirical finding of resilience. Concretely, in the GEJE, damaged 
firms recovered fast if they have transaction partners outside damaged areas [Todo et al., 2015].   
Note that this recovery model is introduced by us. 
 
  Using the model above, we simulate how direct damages due to a natural disaster, represented by 
an exogenous reduction in production capacity of a set of firms, affect the production of the whole 
economy through the propagation of negative shocks along supply chains. In the simulation, we 
utilize the actual supply chains of firms in Japan, obtained from the TSR data. Aj,i and Ci are 
determined from the IO tables and the supply chain ties, as described in Section 2. We assume that 𝜏𝜏 
is six, whereas ni, σ, and γ are parameters in the simulations to fit the actual economic reaction.  
 
  In each simulation, exogenous damages are given on day 0. The damage to each firm is decided by 
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the procedure explained in Section 2. Then, we examine how the sum of value added (or the value of 
production less the total value of intermediates used for the production) of all of the firms in the 
economy changes over time. For each set of parameter values, we simulate 30 times and show the 
results graphically. 
 
   Because the simulation in this study requires substantial computational power due to including 
887,715 agents and 3,223,137 ties, we utilize a supercomputer and run simulations in parallel to 
reduce the run time. Since the simulation can be executed independently for each trial, it can be 
categorized into so-called embarrassingly parallel simulation, and the parallel execution reduces the 
consumption of wall time without loss. The simulation code is shared on GitHub so that the reader 
can run his or her own agents and networks. The code provides abundant variations of simulations. 
See details on the Web site.2 
 
4. Simulation Results and Discussions 
 
4.1 The Great East Japan Earthquake 
 
First, we discuss simulations of the Great East Japan Earthquake. As described in Section 3, we 
create the directly damaged firms based on the distributions. The average of the total direct (initial) 
damages over 30 sets is 1,721 million yen in value added per day. (If the damage is not propagated 
or recovered, the damage per year is 628 billion yen.) 
 
  Figure 4 shows the results of the simulations. The pink plots are the industrial production index. 
To see the actual economy's reactions, we incorporate the index. The industrial production index is 
adjusted so that the value is comparable to the value added of the simulations, i.e., to GDP.  
 
  The reason why we do not use the GDP straightforwardly is that it is reported quarterly. Actually, 
we do not see the change in GDP after the earthquake. This is natural because it includes every effect 
of reactions such as emergent imports, fiscal actions, and also business cycles. To address this 
problem, we use the industrial production index. Because it covers the value added of the mining 
and manufacturing industries and it seems that they reflect the domestic production level. However, 
since these industries seem susceptible to supply chain disruptions, we should note that the 
production cutback might be overestimated. In addition, the actual firms speculate current and 
future situations, so they might withhold their productions. (In contrast, the model has only limited 
information.) 
 
  The red line in Figure 4 shows the simulation results without the recovery. The inventory size of 
firms (ni)has a Poisson distribution with a 10 day average. It decreases to almost zero value added. 
This is because the damage permeates the entire supply chain. Importantly, the propagation is rapid, 
which arises from the path lengths of supply chains between any two firms being very short. 
                                                   
2 https://github.com/HiroyasuInoue/ProductionNetworkSimulator 
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Therefore, a damage can transfer in a very short time. In the network science literature, the network 
has a power-law distribution is called a scale-free network [Barabási, 2016] and the supply chain is 
applicable for it. The scale-free network has ultra-small-world properties, and the average path 
length of the network follows ln ln𝑁𝑁, where N is the number of nodes. Because of the rapid 
propagation, it is important to aid firms immediately after disasters. In addition, from the 
comparison with the industrial production index, the actual system has very strong recovery. 
 
  The green line in Figure 4 indicates the result based on IO table. We apply the same direct damage 
of the simulations and convert them to sectoral decrease of demand. Then, by using Leontief's 
inverse matrix, we calculate the total propagated damages among sectors. The green line is 
horizontal between day 1 to day 365 because we cannot know the propagation along the time. As the 
green line shows, it can be understood that the IO table underestimate the damage. This is because it 
does not consider the constraint of the necessary intermediate goods. 
 
  The blue line in Figure 4 indicates the simulations with calibrated parameters so that the line fits 
the industrial production index. Here, the parameters are the inventory size, the stop day and the 
recovery day. As a result of the parameter searches explained later, we obtain 9 days for the 
inventory size (ni) (the average of the Poisson distribution), 6 days for the stop day (σ) and 0.025 for 
the recovery ratio (γ).  
 
  We see some gaps between the blue line and the pink plots, especially around the first and second 
plots of the industrial production index. This can be understood that the industrial production index 
captured withholding of productions after the disaster. That is, firms produce less to avoid to have 
too much unsold products. Therefore, comprehensively, it can be said that the model replicate the 
indirect effect of the disaster well. 
 
  Here, we interprete the calibrated simulations, especially about the recovery ratio. The supply 
chain in the Japanese economy has recovering capacity equivalent to the recovery that firms 
regenerate by the ratio of 0.025 (γ = 0.025). If there is no damping factor, it means 50% of the 
damage recovers in 28 days, and 90% of the damage recovers in 91 days. This term seems short 
because aid from government, such as financing and taxes, lasts more than one year. The 
discrepancy might be due to our simple assumption of the recovery, namely all of directly damaged 
firms have the same ratio to recover. There should naturally be the diversity in the recovery days 
between firms. Indeed, the questionnaires collected by Teikoku Data Bank state that there are wide 
ranges of diversity, and some firms exit from business. Therefore, some of them require a long time 
to recover, and the aid by government should consider them.  
 
  The calibrations of the paramters are conducted as follows. The parameters of the model are 
calibrated by fitting the simulation outputs and using the industrial production index. The search 
space is a grid. The parameter search ranges from 1 to 20 for the inventory size, from 0 to 20 for the 
stop day, and from 0.005 to 0.100 for the recovery ratio. The step sizes are 1, 1, and 0.005, 
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respectively, and all combinations of the three parameters are tested. Figure 5 shows all of the 
simulations of the parameter search. Based on the results, the squared error is calculated at the point 
when the industrial production index of each month is plotted, and the summation of them is 
considered an evaluation (error) of the parameters. The best parameters are 9 for the inventory size, 
6 for the stop day, and 0.025 for the recovery ratio. 
 
  We plot the direct and indirect damages on the geographical maps on a daily basis. The calibrated 
parameters are used for this step. A sample at day 15 is shown in the left panel of Figure 6. (We have 
uploaded a video of the simulation to the Web3.) Day 15 is chosen because it clealy shows how the 
direct damages are propagated to the entire country in such a shot term. 
 
  We find two indications from the time-series geographical plots. The first finding is the rapid 
spread across the geography. The disaster occurs locally, but it spreads across the country 
immediately, indicating that many firms adjacent to directly damaged firms are geographically 
distant. Obviously, the supply chain has local agglomeration, but simultaneously, it has 
long-distance connections. The second finding is the widely synchronized fluctuations of damages. 
That is, the damages to many firms increase and decrease simultaneously. This outcome can be 
understood from a giant strongly connected component that the supply chain has, and it covers 
49.7% of firms. A giant strongly connected component indicates that any two nodes can traverse 
through links to each other. In addition, in the giant strongly connected component of this supply 
chain, there are numerous loops that cause non-linear behaviors and fluctuations. In the network 
science literature, the network is categoraized into the connected regime [Barabási, 2016], where the 
small-world behavior emerges. 
 
4.2 The Nankai Trough Earthquake 
 
Next, we discuss the NTE. The initial damages are created by following the procedure described in 
Section 2. The average of the total direct (initial) damages over 30 datasets is 21,344 million yen in 
the value added per day. This amount is 12 times larger than the that from the GEJE. The difference 
in direct damages can be seen as a number of plots in Figure 2. Since there are many manufacturing 
firms on the side of the Pacific Ocean, the direct damage is substantially large. 
 
  Figure 7 shows the simulation results. The red line indicates the simulations for the GEJE, and the 
blue line is for the NTE. The parameters calibrated by the GEJE are used for the simulation for NTE. 
We can see that approximately 30% of the output is impaired in NTE at the maximum level. Using 
the summations of the losses compared to the pre-disaster value added, we calculate the total 
damage of the disaster in a year. The total damage of the GEJE is 11,443 billion yen, and that of NTE 
is 51,999 billion yen. The ratio is 4.5. On the other hand, the ratio of the direct damage was 12. 
Therefore, the magnitude of the direct damage does not scale linearly to the indirect damage. This is 
mainly because indirectly damaged firms overlap through the propagation, especially downstream. 
                                                   
3 https://youtu.be/XzRHSFHYKGA 
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If a firm cannot obtain a necessary intermediate to produce, there is no difference even if other 
intermediates cannot be obtained. As discussed in Section 4.1, the network has the giant strongly 
connected component, and it has numerous loops. Therefore, the overlaps seem to frequently occur. 
 
  We see a kink and a plateau at around 70 day. In addition, it was not obvious but the GTE has a 
similar stagnation of the recovery. It mainly comes from the damping factor. First, the damaged 
firms with firms without damaged firms recover (before the stagnations). At this moment, the 
remaining damaged firms seem to be densely connected and show slow recovery. However, as long 
as some of them are connected to non-damaged firms, the system recovers in the end. 
 
  We plot the damage from the NTE on the geographical map and see the change in the time series. 
The example of day 15 is shown in the right panel of Figure 6. (We have uploaded a video of the 
NTE simulation to the Web4.) We see the damages immediately propagate throughout the entire 
country. It is also seen that more firms are affected than the number affected by the GEJE. 
 
4.3 Single firm loss 
 
In the previous simulations, we discussed the actual and predicted earthquakes. However, we can 
create any artificial scenario by adding damages into the supply chain. Regarding such artificial 
disasters, we have simulated many scenarios before [Inoue and Todo, 2017]. These simulations are 
about heterogeneous shocks, network structures, substitutes, regions and industries. In these 
simulations, randomly chosen firms experience damages. 
 
  As a complement to the scenarios, it is beneficial to know how a single firm loss will affect the 
entire economy. That is, a single firm might cause substantial damage to the entire economy or 
might not. 
 
  We simulate 7,332 cases with different firms. The number of samples was decided by 
computational resources. In a simulation, only one firm is completely destroyed at once. The 
influence of the simulation is calculated by (the summation of lost value added in a year) / (the 
summation of value added without damages in a year). We call this value system damage 
henceforth. Theoretically, the system damage can range from 0 to 1. Firms experience no recovery in 
the simulations. 
 
  Figure 8 shows the histogram of the system damage. Surprisingly, more than 90% of firms show 
less than 0.1 system damage. Concretely, 86.6% of sampled firms experience less than 10-5 system 
damage. If we consider the small-world property of the network and no recovery of firms, it can be 
said that the supply chain has strong robustness. Importantly, the robustness comes from substitutes. 
Conversely, 10% of firms cause serious system damage. 
 
                                                   
4 https://youtu.be/FuHEVxOudiQ 
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  We check the Kendall correlation coefficients between the system damage and other variables for 
each firm. The variables are degree (number of suppliers and clients), in-degree (number of 
suppliers), out-degree (number of clients), amount of labor, number of institutes, number of factories, 
sales, and capital. The degree is 0.326, which is the largest, and the out-degree is 0.325, which is the 
second largest. In contrast, the-in degree is 0.239, indicating that a supplier with some number of 
clients has more risk than a client with the same number of suppliers. This finding corresponds to, in 
the short term, the downstream shock being more serious than the upstream shock, as described in 
our simulation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We used the nationwide supply-chain network data of Japan, simulated the GEJE and calibrated the 
parameters of a modified model from [Hallegatte, 2008]. With the parameters, we examined the 
predicted NTE. As a result, we obtained the following findings. (1) The simulation result of the 
GETE finely reproduces the affected supply chains in the Japanese economy in the sense of 
propagations of damages and recoveries from them. (2) Indirect damages of both earthquakes 
geographically permeate the entire country in a quite short term. Additionally, the damages to firms 
show synchronized fluctuations due to the network structure. (3) The simulations of NTE show that 
direct damages are 12 times greater than those from the GETE, but indirect damages are 
approximately 4.5 times greater in a year. (4) By estimating indirect damage triggered by a single 
firm loss, approximately 10% of firms cause more than 10 % damage of the entire supply chain. 
 
  This study has much potential for enhancement. The recovery mechanism introduced in the 
model was very simple, but switching suppliers/clients is a potent measure as discussed. Actually, 
after the GEJE, it is known that firms enhanced the OEM agreements by which they could 
accommodate each other regarding necessary products. Since we have network data from after the 
disaster, we can observe and incorporate the actions. Another future work is to use global supply 
chain data. Since some countries have stronger community structures (a densely connected 
component of supply chains) than other countries have, it is expected that we would see different 
behaviors of propagations; therefore, we could measure different risks starting from each country. In 
addition, we could refine the simulation of the GEJE by considering the reduced power supply, 
mainly caused by the stoppage of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. Finally, as Otto et al. 
proposed [Otto et al., 2017], the model could incorporate price mechanisms so that we could 
consider markets. 
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Table 1: Distribution of destruction. These data are for the coast side and inland. Data from [The Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2011]. 
 
 Complete destruction Partial destruction Some destruction 
Coast side 54.4% 12.7% 28.7% 
Inland 2.5% 2.7% 82.7% 
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Figure 1: Actual and predicted areas damaged by earthquakes. Left: Actual areas damaged by the Great 
East Japan Earthquake. Areas damaged by earthquakes are colored pink. Tsunami damage areas are 
colored blue. X indicates is the epicenter. Right: Predicted areas damaged by the next Nankai Trough 
earthquake. The colors have the same meanings. 
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Figure 2: Samples of damaged firms chosen stochastically. Left: A sample from the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. Right: A sample from the prediction of the next Nankai Trough earthquake. Based on the 
distribution of damage, damages is assigned to firms stochastically. We see that the firms on the coast 
side are seriously damaged.  
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Figure 3: Overview of model. The flow of the product is from left to right, but orders have the opposite 
directions. Most equations are embedded with reference numbers. Inventories correspond to each 
product. Actual production is a function of product inventories, production capacity, and demand. The 
actual production is equal to the realized demand (from [Inoue and Todo, 2017]). 
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Figure 4: The Great East Japan Earthquake simulation and calibration. The horizontal axis shows days. 
The vertical axis shows the total value added in yen. The pink dots show the industrial production index. 
Since the index is published every month, the dots are placed on the last day of the month. 
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Figure 5: All simulations of parameter calibration: the parameters are inventory size, stop day, and 
recovery day. Errors are calculated between industrial production indices and simulations. 
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Figure 6: Geographic plots of damage. Left figure is the damage on day 15 caused by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. Right figure is from the Nankai Trough Earthquake. These images are derived from the 
initial direct damages depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of the predicted Nankai Trough Earthquake and the Great East Japan Earthquake: 
the meanings of the axes are the same as in Figure 4. 
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Figure 8: Histogram of system damage: horizontal axis is delimited by 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
